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Oil supplies coming from the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf to
South East and East Asia are mostly shipped through
the Strait of Malacca. There has been a long-standing idea to dig a canal
through Thailand's part of the Malay Peninsula, the so-called Thai Canal,
which would create a new sea lane of communication. It would allow ships
to move between the Indian and Pacific Oceans without having to pass
through the Strait of Malacca. The Canal would not just relieve pressure
on the Strait in terms of maritime security, but would also cut
transportation costs significantly. Despite the economic advantages,
the possible construction and use of the Thai Canal
could pose certain political and security concerns.
trust, mutual benefit, effectiveness, coordination and
equality in negotiation. Maritime security is of par-
ticular strategic importance because this is essentially
a maritime region, so the unimpeded transit of goods
is vital for the prosperity of all countries concerned.
Inevitably, it requires and will continue to require
continued bilateral and multilateral cooperation.
It is expected that in the 21st century two-
thirds of the world's population will be concentrated
in the western Pacific and East Indian Ocean area,
which makes the need for efficient and effective trade
all the more necessary. At present, Asia buys roughly
two-thirds of all the oil produced in the Persian Gulf,
and by 2010 that rate will increase to approximately
75 percent.' Oil supplies coming to South East and
East Asia are shipped from ports in the Red Sea or
the Persian Gulf. The sea lanes of communication
there converge into the Arabian Sea, then pass
through the Gulf of Mannar and curve off the west-
ern, southern and southeastern coast of Sri Lanka.
This sea lane then turns northeast through the Bay
of Bengal towards the Strait of Malacca.
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1. Introduction
Southeast Asia is a region of strategic impor-
tance to many countries from all continents because
of its huge concentration of industrial, technologi-
cal and military power, as well as globally important
sea lanes of communication. There is also a wide
spectrum of other stake-holders involved, primarily
various multinational corporations. Today, the
economy in the South East Asia region maintains an
unprecedented momentum of growth while a frame-
work of open, mutually beneficial cooperation be-
tween countries is taking shape in various forms. As
a result of enhanced multilateral security dialogue
and cooperation, the overall security environment
remains stable. I Although some differences and con-
tradiction of interests continue to exist, in general
the countries ofthe region increasingly share the view
of a new political and security concept of mutual
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This is the most frequently used lane, circling
all the way around the Malay Peninsula. The alter-
native lanes passing through Sunda and Lombok are
even longer, adding approximately up to four days
to the journey.
There has been a long-standing idea to dig a
canal through Thailand's part of the Malay Penin-
sula, the so-called Thai Canal, which would create a
new sea lane of communication in South East Asia,
similar to the Panama Canal in Central America or
the Suez Canal between Africa and the Middle East.
It is also known as the Kra Canal or Kra Isthmus
Canal, named after a narrow neck of the Malay Pe-
ninsula which was identified as one of the most con-
venient sites for a canal.' The canal is projected to
be wide enough to accommodate two ships. It would
allow ships to move between the Indian and Pacific
Oceans without having to pass through the Strait of
Malacca.
It is estimated that such a canal would shorten
the journey, for example, of a supertanker filled with
oil heading for Japan from the Middle East by at
least 700 nautical miles (about five days' sailing
time).' At the same time, it is expected that the Thai
Canal would not just relieve pressure on the Strait
ofMalacca, but also cut transportation costs by mil-
lions of US. dollars, which represents an important
issue for the energy sector.
Despite the unquestionable economic advan-
tages, however, history has shown that both the
Panama and Suez Canals were sometimes objects of
some vital political and security concerns with wider
international implications, occasionally even bring-
ing states to the edge of war. Similarly, the possible
construction and use of the Thai Canal could also
pose certain political and security concerns.
2. Safety and Security Challenges
in the Strait of Malacca
The Strait of Malacca is one of the busiest sea
lanes of communication in the world, with 30 per-
cent of total world trade and almost 80,000 commer-
cial ships passing through it each year.' It is esti-
mated that one third of the world's trade and half of
the world's oil supplies pass through the Strait of
Malacca, including some 80 percent of China's and
Japan's oil supplies, which makes shipping in the
Strait extremely crowded. Oil tanker traffic through
the Strait of Malacca is projected to grow to 20 mil-
lion barrels a day in 2020, compared to 10 million
barrels a day only five years ago." On the other hand,
the Strait is almost 1,000 kilometers long but just 25
meters deep at its shallowest point, and it is narrow,
presenting the potential for collision (the Philip
Channel, a natural bottleneck near Singapore, is only
2,5 km wide).
Non-traditional threats in the region such as
terrorism, separatism, extremism, piracy,
transnational crimes and arms proliferation are grow-
ing rampantly. Its strategic importance makes the
Strait of Malacca an extremely attractive target for
terrorist groups that are seeking to achieve large-scale
political success. For example, if a tanker sank or
were attacked, especially in the narrowest parts of
the Strait, world trade and energy supplies would be
affected because other ships could be forced to take
long detours, thus holding up shipments for weeks.
Although the primary responsibility for the
overall safety and security in the Strait lies with the
littoral states, i.e. Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore,
a new trend of merging non-traditional threats, in
the sense that international terrorism, extremist forces
and pirates collude with and exploit one another,
makes security a common issue to be dealt with by
all countries concerned." Also, as the repercussions
of any maritime accident or attack in the Strait of
Malacca could go far beyond the region's bounda-
ries, a wider approach in terms of the inclusion of
all interested countries is required not just with re-
gard to maritime safety and security in the Strait of
Malacca, but also with regard to any effort aimed at
creating an alternative sea lane of communication,
such as the possible construction of the Thai Canal.
3. Plans for Constructing
the Thai Canal through History
As the Malay Peninsula significantly enlarged
the shipping routes around Asia, a canal was pro-
posed as early as 1677, when the Thai King Narai
the Great asked the French engineer de Lamar to
explore the possibility of constructing a canal to con-
nect Songkhla with Marid, now Myanmar. However,
it turned out to be too impractical with the technol-
ogy of the time. In 1793 the idea was revived by
Rama I, the younger brother of King Chakri, who
suggested a canal to better protect the western coast
with military ships. Also in the early 18th century,
the British East India Company became interested
in a canal. During the reign of King Rama IV, around
1858, England applied for the King's permission to
dig the canal along the Ranong-Langsuan route,
which is the shortest route. The King approved but
the funds ran out before the dig could be completed.
In 1863, after Burma became a British colony, Eng-
land surveyed the shortest route (with Victoria Point
opposite the Kra estuary as its southernmost point),
but came to a standstill after not having enough tools
to dig through the mountain ridge. From 1866-1868,
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France - after completing the Suez Canal - negoti-
ated to dig the canal across the Malay Peninsula. King
Rama IV did not approve for reasons of the King-
dom's security. In 1882 the constructor of the Suez
Canal, Ferdinand de Lesseps, visited the area but was
not allowed to explore in detail by the Thai king.
Finally, in 1897 Thailand and the British Empire
agreed not to build a canal in the Malay Peninsula in
order to protect the regional dominance of the port
of Singapore.
In the 20th century the idea was revived sev-
eral times, this time moving the preferred route fur-
ther to the south of Thailand (to connect Bandon Bay
near Surat Thani with Phangnga). One study con-
ducted in 1970 indicated that the optimum route is
the Satul-Songkla route. The latest proposed route
is across the Nakhon Si Thammarat and Trang prov-
inces. Depending on the route chosen, a canal would
be 100-120 km long. It is expected to take up to 10
years to complete and cost around 23 billion USD.
4. International Law with Regard
to the Construction on and Use
of Artificial Waterways
Under international law, states are free to build
artificial waterways on their territory, including wa-
terways that connect two seas and thus shorten the
distance between them (for example, the Corinth
Canal built by Greece), and even to shorten the dis-
tance between two distant parts of the world. Such
canals fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
country whose territory is concerned. Of course, such
a general rule does not prevent any country from
determining the special legal status of a canal by an
international agreement, which is usually the case
when a canal holds particular importance as a wa-
terway and there are numerous countries, or at least
some very influential countries, interested in its con-
struction. For example, such circumstances led to
the construction and designation of special legal sta-
tus to two very important artificial waterways in the
world - the Suez Canal and the Panama Canal. It is
important to emphasize, however, that in both cases
there were some specific circumstances that were
decisive in determining special legal status - a canal
was built on a territory of an undeveloped country
that had no expertise or funds to build a canal on its
own. Under such circumstances, a developed and
influential country stepped in and used its influence
to enable its capital to obtain a concession and, fi-
nally, to take control over the canal thus limiting the
exclusive jurisdiction of the host country. On the
other hand, an influential country would not just
manage to spread its influence but would also achieve
its particular political goals based on the existence
of a canal and its control over it.
The significant international importance of
some artificial waterways, as well as the fact that
freedom of passage through them is guaranteed by
international agreements, led some to the conclusion
that such freedom of passage is a reflection of com-
mon international law which would oblige countries
to respect such a freedom despite the obligations
taken on by the signing of the respective interna-
tional agreement. For example, in the 1923 case of
the ship "Wimbledon," the Permanent Court of In-
ternational Justice in issuing its ruling on the free-
dom of navigation through the Kiel Canal in Ger-
many, basically based its decision on the international
legal status of the Suez and Panama Canals: "Moreo-
ver, they (the Suez and Panama canal regimes) are
merely illustrations of the general opinion accord-
ing to which when an artificial waterway connect-
ing two open seas has been permanently dedicated
to the use of the whole world, such waterway is as-
similated to natural straits in the sense that even the
passage of a belligerent man-of-war does not com-
promise the neutrality of the sovereign State under
whose jurisdiction the waters in question lie."! How-
ever, such an opinion cannot be accepted because
there is no rule in contemporary common interna-
tional law which would impose such an obligation
on any country, unless a country should specifically
obligate itself by signing some international agree-
ment or by some kind of unilateral legally binding
act which provides for the full freedom of naviga-
tion of other countries' ships, including warships."
It is also possible that international agreements
prevent a state from exercising its right to build a
canal on its own territory. On 1 January 1946, an
agreement was signed in Singapore between the
United Kingdom, India and Thailand. By Article 7
of that agreement, the Government of Thailand
obliged itself not to allow the construction of a ca-
nal across the Kra Isthmus, which would connect the
Gulf of Thailand and the South China Sea. Singa-
pore was a British colony at the time. However, the
agreement was cancelled in 1954 and Singapore
gained its independence in 1965.
5. From Thailand's Perspective
The idea of the Thai Canal is revived with each
new government that is formed in Thailand, mostly
as a part of efforts to solve economic difficulties in
the country." Common terms of reference include
sovereignty over the canal and the utilization of Thai
labor and construction materials. II There is an opin-
ion among some that Thailand needs a new vision of
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belonging to the global economic community by
gaining new access to oil and financial resources. 12
It is expected that a canal would not only jump-start
the economy in the country as a whole, but would
create prosperity particularly in the south by intro-
ducing a new dynamism along the waterway. There
is a hope that a canal will turn Thailand into a re-
gional commercial and fmancial hub, even if only
one-fourth of the ships currently passing through the
Strait of Malacca used the Thai Canal. 13 Among the
opinions in favor of constructing a canal, there is a
notion that a canal would finally help Thailand real-
ize and exercise its power over the sea because the
country is on both the Indian and Pacific Oceans.
Although such a project should facilitate the Thai
Navy's modernization programs to improve its ex-
isting contingent of battleships, frigates and patrol
boats, it is questionable whether the country could
afford it without relying on foreign military assist-
ance. This also means that the Thai Navy's pivotal
role in providing maritime security both in the Gulf
of Thailand and in the Andaman Sea is not very likely
to become a reality without reliance upon some other
country's navy. While keeping in mind the tradition-
ally strong bilateral ties between Thailand and the
U.S., it should not come as a surprise if the U.S. Navy
plays an important role on both sides of the canal.
Of course, that would also bring into question the
overall feasibility of the Thai authorities' declared
desire for sovereignty over a canal.
China has offered Thailand a plan for the con-
struction of a canal over ten years, employing roughly
30,000 Chinese workers and costing between 20 and
25 billion USD, including Chinese port facilities,
refineries, warehouses and other infrastructure."
Thailand's position with regard to China's offer, how-
ever, is still non-committal because its acceptance
would contradict the basic Thai principles for the
construction of a canal, i.e. no foreign funds and
labor, full control over the canal, etc.
From the internal security point of view, the
issue of cutting a country in half by a canal appears
to have many opponents in Thailand. Actually, there
is heated debate across the nation, led primarily by
those who are concerned about the possible loss of
the southern provinces of Yala, Pattani and
Narathiwat to separatists after a geographical divi-
sion of the country into two parts. There are occa-
sionally even accusations that project supporters re-
ceive money from Muslim countries. 15 On the other
hand, many believe that with sufficient economic
development the separatist threat could be effectively
dealt with." Among those in Thailand who oppose
the idea of the Thai Canal are local environmental-
ists who are concerned about the impact of the canal
on the environment. There is also the issue of the
social cost of relocating residents, depending on the
route decided upon. 17
For all these reasons the plan for constructing
the Thai Canal has remained in doubt, as in years
past. 18 Meanwhile, another Thai project has gradu-
ally emerged, aimed at making the need for a Thai
Canal obsolete but also intended to reduce transpor-
tation costs and security risks for tankers in the Strait
of Malacca. It is the idea of building a land bridge
between the Gulf of Thailand and the Andaman Sea.
The total distance would be 220 km and it would
consist of a four-lane highway, with 150 m in the
center to carry railway tracks and pipelines. The idea
also includes the set-up of a refinery on both sides
of the land bridge. 19 Two oil depots and one refmery
would be built, and a petrochemical industry estab-
lished." The construction of a land bridge was actu-
ally started in 1993 but as the location of the harbors
wasn't fixed the highway is currently the only com-
pleted part of the project although it does not reach
the sea yet. As planned, the lanes of the highway
were built 150 m apart to leave space for a railway
and, eventually, also a pipeline. The project, how-
ever, has stalled mostly due to environmental con-
cerns."
6. From the Perspective of the
Strait of Malacca's Littoral States
Although there is no such official position in
Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, there is strong
political opposition in these countries, particularly
in Singapore, to the idea of the possible construc-
tion of the Thai Canal because it would inevitably
create direct competition with the most important
ports in the Strait of Malacca area, resulting in sig-
nificant economic losses. If the Thai Canal project
does proceed, however, there are indications that
Indonesia and Malaysia would express interest in
investing in the project."
Opposing the plan for constructing the Thai
Canal are particularly strong voices in Indonesia,
Malaysia and Singapore that claim that maritime
security has vastly improved in the Strait ofMalacca
and that the threat of pirate attacks is no longer seri-
ous. In support ofthis position is a network of bilat-
eral arrangements between these countries, as well
as some new arrangements of a multilateral nature
such as the permanent "Strait of Malacca Coordi-
nated Patrols" carried out by their navies. More re-
cently, these countries also launched a joint air pa-
trol arrangement for the Strait ofMalacca, known as
the "Eyes in the Sky" patrols. Under this arrange-
ment, surveillance aircrafts from the Strait's littoral
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states would patrol the Strait and report any suspi-
cious activities to ground enforcement units for fol-
low-up response if necessary. The "Eyes in the Sky"
patrol is an open arrangement so non-littoral states
concerned are also welcome to take part. It is also
argued that digging a canal would be a very expen-
sive solution to a problem that doesn't seem that se-
vere." There is also an opinion held by some that a
canal would not be attractive for container ships,
which travel quite fast, but only for slow oil tank-
ers." However, the unofficial, prevailing opinion in
Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore is that Thailand
will never be able to build a canal across the Malay
Peninsula under its self-proclaimed principles.
Still, according to some estimates, if built the
Thai Canal would divert half the shipping tonnage
now calling in at Singapore up north to Thailand,
which would have a huge and permanent impact on
Singapore's economy because its prosperity has al-
ways primarily relied on its position as a maritime
port. Despite its relatively small territory and lack
of natural resources, Singapore's strategic location
along major sea lanes of communication has given
the country a unique economic significance in South-
east Asia." Situated at the crossroads of international
maritime and air routes, Singapore is the world's larg-
est transit shipping port and second largest (after
Hong Kong) port for containerized transshipment
traffic." For these reasons, those who think that Sin-
gapore should object if the construction of the canal
commences advocate that Singapore should get a big
stake in the project, in other words, that it should
either be offered a part of the project or given sub-
stantial compensation. Finally, it must also be taken
into consideration that in Singapore there are invest-
ments of more than 7,000 multinational corporations
from the U.S., Japan and many European countries,
accounting for more than two-thirds of manufactur-
ing output and direct export sales in almost all sec-
tors of the economy. The economic interests and in-
fluence of these multinational corporations should
not be underestimated, either in terms of opposing
the possible construction of the Thai Canal or advo-
cating such an effort if and when accompanying eco-
nomic factors become beneficial for them.
After his retirement, the former Malaysian
Prime Minister Mahathir once said that the Thai
Canal would be good for the region, even though
Malaysia's own port business, particularly in Port
Klang, would suffer if it went ahead. Consequently,
a counter-project aimed at easing the congestion of
the Strait of Malacca has been initiated by Malay-
sia. Actually, some say that lack of progress on the
Thai Canal project sped up its initiation. It is the
Trans-Peninsula pipeline (TRANSPEN), about 300
kilometers in length, which would cut across Ma-
laysia's northern states of Kedah, Perak and
Kelantan, avoiding Thailand by several kilometers
just below the border. Support facilities for deep-
draught tankers at either end are also planned. The
main idea is to bypass the Strait of Malacca and di-
vert some 20 per cent of oil flowing through the Strait.
At the same time, the project is part of the Malaysian
government's effort to develop the country's north-
ern region. Agreements for the construction of the
pipeline have already been signed by Malaysian, In-
donesian and Saudi Arabian companies. The com-
pletion of the entire project is planned for 2014.
7. From China's Perspective
China's approach to bilateral and multilateral
relations, as well as to security issues, reflects a new
flexibility and sophistication stemming from a de-
sire to both protect and promote Chinese economic
interests and enhance China's security." On the other
hand, from the perspective of other Asian countries,
making the best of China's development by expand-
ing their cooperation with China has become the
unanimous choice." China's offer to Thailand to
construct the Thai Canal partially arises from Chi-
na's recognition of other Asian countries' views on
its own development in terms of their mutual coop-
eration and interest.
According to the World Bank, in 2006 China
became the world's fourth largest economy." At the
same time, China is the second largest consumer of
oil in the world and the third largest importer of oi1.30
As China's economy grows, oil consumption is ex-
pected to grow at an average rate of 5.8 percent for
the next 10 years, which means that foreign oil is
gradually becoming a center of gravity critical to
China's energy needs, while dependence on secure
access to energy resources is becoming increasingly
important." At present, some 80 percent of China's
crude oil imports come from the Middle East and
Africa, transiting through the Strait of Malacca."
Conversely, China has had little success in develop-
ing reliable oil pipelines from Russia and Central
Asia. It is expected, therefore, that China will de-
pend on the Middle East for the vast bulk of its grow-
ing oil imports for the foreseeable future." It is a
vulnerability that the Chinese President Hu Jintao
refers to as the "Malacca Dilemma," meaning that
China will for the foreseeable future continue to de-
pend heavily on international sea lanes of communi-
cation, including the Strait of Malacca, whose vul-
nerability is perceived as a geopolitical risk because
China's current means of protecting sea lanes are
quite limited." There is no urgency on China's part,
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however, because its dependency on foreign energy
supplies is still at a comparatively low level - be-
tween 15 and 18 percent of total energy consump-
tion - while output of China's crude oil can ensure
nearly half of the oil supply." Still, in terms of plan-
ning and working in the mid- and long-term, the
Chinese offer to Thailand to construct the Thai Ca-
nal as an alternate way to ship oil is not surprising."
There is also an opinion among some that
China wants to bypass the Strait ofMalacca because
it is considered U.S.-influenced territory. From the
Chinese perspective, having the Thai Canal built
could reduce the prospects of a possible U.S. em-
bargo or blockade on oil supplies shipped through
the Strait of Malacca in case of any conflict over
Taiwan." Another similar Chinese opinion empha-
sizes that the history of capitalism and its spread glo-
bally has shown that it is often accompanied by cruel
competition between states." The bottom line of both
opinions is that any substantial blockade of its for-
eign energy supplies and/or trade-dependent
economy could gravely imperil China.
Meanwhile, a lack of progress and the ques-
tionable outcome of the Thai Canal project have ac-
celerated China's efforts to conduct several other
projects of strategic importance for its economy, for
e.g. oil pipelines from Sittwe in Myanmar to the
Chinese Yunnan province, as well as from Gwadar
in Pakistan to the Chinese Xinjiang province.
With regard to the U.S. 's concerns about Chi-
na's plans to strengthen its maritime capabilities to
help ensure the safe passage of its resources through
international waterways, the Chinese position is that
a security boundary is the boundary of one's inter-
ests. Wherever China's interests lie, they must be
followed by its respective capabilities to protect those
interests, both in regional and global terms. In an era
when development is a core Chinese national inter-
est, China would secure nothing if it did not have a
strong navy." However, from the Chinese perspec-
tive, a strong navy should not be considered in the
traditional, Western sense of a sea power - as one's
ability to control the sea - but rather in the sense of
equality of sea rights and sea power, where the ap-
plication of power cannot exceed sea rights. From
such a perspective China's notion of sea power is
fundamentally peaceful and its naval build-up is con-
fined solely to the role of providing self-defense and
deterrence. The goal of a strong Chinese Navy is to
provide China with the ability to independently stand
up for its rights on an equal footing with others."
8. From Japan's and South
Korea's Perspectives
The Japanese and South Korean economies
are heavily dependent on the passage of commercial
traffic through the Strait of Malacca, so transporta-
tion costs represent an important issue for their en-
ergy sectors and industries in general. Only Japan is
over 90 percent dependent on oil imports, and ap-
proximately 20 percent of its economy is dependent
on foreign trade." By using the Thai Canal, approxi-
mately 300,000 USD in crew and fuel costs would
be saved on the individual voyage of one oil super-
tanker. Consequently, in 1990 Japanese companies
expressed their readiness to support the construction
of the Thai Canal. 42 Also, the company which con-
ducted the Kra Canal study in the mid-90s, i.e. Phuket
Pass Project Ltd., was partially financed by Japa-
nese interests."
9. From India's Perspective
Over a period of several centuries, the Indian
Ocean was first controlled by Iberian countries and
then by the British Empire which forced India to
become a British colony due to its failed sea power.
In India there is an opinion that even today, if India
cannot establish an effective national security shield
in the Indian Ocean as its geopolitical zone, then it
will never have a secure future. 44
The sea lanes of communication from the Ara-
bian Sea pass through the Gulf of Mannar and curve
off the western, southern and southeastern coast of
Sri Lanka. In order to achieve a better strategic posi-
tion, India has begun the so-called Sethusamudram
project of deepening and widening the sea belt be-
tween its shore and Sri Lanka. The aim is to create
an unavoidable bypass that would divert sea traffic
coming from the Middle East through India's own
maritime waters. The strategic importance of such a
bypass is related to India's ambitions for becoming
the Indian Ocean's predominant naval power and
achieving important leverage in its relations with
China, Japan and the U.S.45
In recent years India has also strengthened
military cooperation with Thailand and Indonesia,
particularly through naval exercises focused on en-
suring security on sea routes linking the Indian and
Pacific Oceans. Although India is not party to any
security arrangement for the Malacca Strait, the im-
mediate purpose of the joint patrols is to prevent
smuggling, piracy, drugs and arms trafficking, poach-
ing and illegal immigration in the region. Apart from
the economic value, India recognizes a growing ne-
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cessity to ensure the security of the world's ship-
ping.
If the Thai Canal were built, all ships destined
for the Canal would have to pass through the chan-
nel between India's Andaman and Nicobar island
chains, which would make that project fully com-
plementary with the Sethusamudram project, to the
benefit of India's maritime interests. However, the
risk of pollution from oil tankers around the Andaman
and Nicobar islands could undermine India's plans
to boost tourism there. Although the outcome of the
Chinese proposal to Thailand for constructing the
Thai Canal with Chinese funds and labor remains
questionable, India has already achieved a lot with
regard to its leverage with China by commencing
the Sethusamudram project.
10. From the United States'
Perspective
Since World War II, the u.s. has been an im-
portant political, military and economic stakeholder
not just in South East Asia, but worldwide. As such,
the u.s. has enabled much of Asia's free trade by
guaranteeing freedom of navigation throughout
Asia's major sea lanes of communication. During
that time, no nation has had the naval forces neces-
sary to adequately protect its own long-haul com-
mercial shipping in the region or the capacity to as-
sume the responsibility of protecting the sea in that
part of the world in general. Not only does it benefit
the u.s. to protect the vital interests of its close Asian
allies, particularly Japan and South Korea, but the
U.S. is bound by treaty to secure Japanese and South
Korean sea lanes of communication for transit of their
goods to market and for the flow of energy resources
and raw materials." The defining characteristic of
the current relationship between the U.S. even with
other Asian countries, including China, is strongly
linked economies with robust trade.
At the same time, as the world's largest oil
consumer the U.S. is accelerating its realignment of
military deployment to enhance its military capabil-
ity in the Asia-Pacific region." Currently, the U.S.
Navy's home port at Guam, with logistical support
from Diego Garcia or another location with imme-
diate access to the Indian Ocean, makes it that much
easier. By holding frequent joint military exercises,
providing military assistance and enhancing coun-
ter-terrorism cooperation, the U.S. has also achieved
important tools for becoming involved in Asia-Pa-
cific security affairs." Although the U.S. 's initiative
to deploy the Marine Corps and Special Forces to
the Strait of Malacca in the name of counter-terror-
ism and eradicating piracy has suffered a setback due
to the strong opposition of Indonesia and Malaysia,
the U.S. - in consideration of its own strategic inter-
ests - most probably will not give up easily on the
issue in the future." In a wider context, if the Thai
Canal were built the U.S. would gain faster access
from Guam to the Persian Gulf. It would also be of
particular benefit with regard to a military base that
the U.S. allegedly has been developing in Sri Lanka."
It is highly questionable, however, whether the
USA would in fact gain (or lose) more, perhaps not
directly but indirectly, because of all the advantages
the construction of the Thai Canal would bring to
China as a potential strategic rival to the U.S.51 There
is an opinion among some in the U.S. that the Chi-
nese offer to Thailand to construct the Thai Canal is
only part of the wider Chinese so-called "String of
Pearls" strategy of forward bases and diplomatic ties
for its enhanced energy security, from the Middle
East to South China, as well as part of China's wider
and long-term military plans." As a result, China's
interest in constructing the canal has raised concerns
at the Pentagon that its military build-up is not just
aimed at the protection of Chinese economic inter-
ests, as has been repeatedly stated by Chinese offi-
cials, but that it is also aimed at a projection of force
overseas and undermining the U.S. 's regional domi-
nance." From the U.S. 's perspective, the analysis of
China's military acquisitions and strategic thinking
suggests that China is generating capabilities not just
with regard to the Taiwan Strait, but also for other
regional contingencies, such as possible conflicts
over resources or territory. 54 For example, concern
over critical sea lanes for energy imports has been
prompting China to pursue stronger maritime capa-
bilities that would help it ensure the safe passage of
resources through international waterways. 55 There
is an understanding in the U.S. that China's strategy
and policy, as well as its strategic behavior, are largely
and will increasingly be affected by its reliance on
foreign energy imports. For this reason, the expand-
ing military capabilities of the People's Liberation
Army (PLA), from the U.S. 's perspective, could eas-
ily become a major factor in changing East Asian
military balances, while improvements in China's
strategic capabilities have ramifications far beyond
the Asia-Pacific region." It has to be clearly noted,
however, that China's development of the so-called
strategic geopolitical "pearls" has so far been non-
confrontational, with no evidence of imperial or
neocolonial ambition. 57
Within the wider context described above, if
the Thai Canal were not in the interest of the U.S.
because of the strategic benefits it could bring to
China, it is to be expected that bilateral relations
between the U.S. and its traditional ally Thailand
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could also include (or already include) an "anti-ca-
nal" dimension. The U.S. 's efforts against the con-
struction of the Thai Canal under Chinese influence
also could be aimed at broadening and deepening
American influence in some other ways that have
wide appeal among other key states, particularly the
Strait of Malacca's littoral states, i.e. Indonesia,
Malaysia and Singapore, that are identified clearly
by the U.S. National Security Strategy as "friends
and allies."
11. Conclusion
Although the possible construction of the Thai
Canal would not produce such a significant shortcut
as was the case with the Panama or Suez Canals,
there should be no doubt that it would shorten the
duration and reduce the costs of maritime transpor-
tation of energy resources and raw materials from
the Indian Ocean to the Pacific Ocean, as well as
provide safer and more secure navigation conditions
compared to those in the Strait of Malacca. How-
ever, with the exception of Thailand and indirectly
Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam, the Canal
would bring many more economic benefits to the
countries of East Asia than to the countries of South
East Asia. For this reason, the Strait of Malacca's
littoral states, particularly Singapore, are cautious
because the Canal could severely diminish their im-
portance as transit points and thus affect their econo-
mies. As all the countries mentioned are members
of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN), the possible construction of the Thai Ca-
nal is an issue that should also receive consensus
among all these countries, in the sense that common
economic interest for the construction of the Thai
Canal has to be identified, regardless of the particu-
lar interest of Thailand.
Although there is no doubt that according to
international law countries are free to build artifi-
cial waterways on their territory, including water-
ways that connect two seas and shorten the distance
between distant parts of the world, maintaining ex-
clusive jurisdiction over such waterways, it does not
seem very likely that Thailand would take such a
step without prior coordination with other ASEAN
member states. Simply, the unity of economic effort
is too deeply rooted among the ASEAN member
states. Furthermore, it is unlikely that any unilateral
project with serious economic implications will take
place while the economy of South East Asia main-
tains an unprecedented momentum of growth and the
overall security environment remains stable.
The security, political and international legal
implications ofthe possible construction of the Thai
Canal with another country's funds and labor also
makes this a project that goes beyond the bilateral
relations of Thailand and any other country. The his-
tory of the Panama and Suez Canals shows that de-
spite the unquestionable economic advantages of a
canal, one country's funding of its construction on
the territory of another country usually leads to the
spread of significant influence by the first country
and to the achievement of its particular political and
security goals, as well as to the limitation of the host
country's sovereignty over the canal which, com-
bined, could sooner or later create security and po-
litical tensions and instability with wider interna-
tional repercussions, sometimes even bringing states
to the edge of war. For these reasons, Thailand's
unimpeded sovereignty over the Canal would be the
most appropriate solution, including its authority to
create regulations with regard to the regime of pas-
sage of warships or the possible complete demilita-
rization of the canal and adjacent areas, etc.
In terms of Thailand's own internal security,
the possible construction of the Thai Canal should
primarily meet all concerns raised. Currently, it seems
that the required level of consensus on internal se-
curity issues has still not been reached in Thailand,
largely due to continuing debates about whether the
Canal would facilitate the separation of southern
provinces or their re-integration with the rest of the
country. With regard to safety and security risks cur-
rently present in the Strait of Malacca that would be
eliminated or diminished by the possible construc-
tion of the Thai Canal, one of the unquestionable
advantages of the Thai Canal would be the elimina-
tion of the threat of piracy. However, in the case of
terrorism or a maritime accident, a canal would by
its definition still represent a chokepoint. As the re-
percussions of any maritime accident or attack in the
Strait of Malacca or in a possible Thai Canal could
go far beyond the region's boundaries, it would also
require continued and concerted multilateral coop-
eration.
Primarily because of Thailand's strong eco-
nomic ties with other member states of ASEAN, en-
gaging in direct bilateral contacts with Thailand with
regard to the possible construction of the Thai Canal
may not be a sufficient effort because of all the vari-
ous regional implications that such a project brings.
With regard to possible further steps by China in re-
lation to the Thai Canal project, it has to be noted
that China has already demonstrated a high level of
flexibility in its recent relations with other countries
and international organizations, particularly in terms
of open and peaceful regionalism that avoids exclud-
ing or targeting any third party countries, including
the U.S. As such, China's approach reflects a new
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flexibility and sophistication, either because of the
protection and promotion of Chinese economic in-
terests or the enhancement of China's security. Chi-
na's initiative with regard to the Thai Canal project
towards ASEAN within the 10+ 1 format, or together
with Japan and South Korea within the 10+3 format
could be quite a logical move, one that would pro-
vide the necessary impetus for breaking the current
stalemate with regard to China's offer to Thailand.
The best way to move things forward could
be a promotion of economic cooperation and con-
sultation based on a "win-win"-strategy, because
experience has shown that from the perspective of
other Asian countries, including those of ASEAN,
making the best of China's development by expand-
ing cooperation with China has already become these
countries' choice. Although there is currently seri-
ous political opposition to the idea of the possible
construction of the Thai Canal among the Strait of
Malacca's littoral states, there is still an interest in
these countries to invest in the Thai Canal. Based on
that, it is fair to say that economic factors could very
likely determine whether and when the Thai Canal
is actually built. As a consequence of the expecta-
tions for significant growth in oil tanker traffic in
South East Asia by 2020, pluralism and the mutual
compatibility of sea lanes of communication, includ-
ing both the Strait of Malacca and the possible Thai
Canal, could become a desirable solution to the prob-
lem. Also, within ASEAN there are countries that
individually have nothing to lose by the possible
construction of the Thai Canal, but could benefit from
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